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John Toland’s Pivotal Version of
Secularism at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century
by
Edward Jayne
John Toland (1669-1722) bore a remarkable career throughout his life-long
confrontation with religion. He was raised a Catholic in Ireland, but converted
to Protestantism during his education at Glasgow and Edinburgh Universities in
Scotland. He later became what was described as a latitudinarian (or Low
Churchman) at Leyden University in the Netherlands, and while completing his
education at Oxford University he could be more accurately described as “a man
of fine parts, great learning, and little religion.” Most of the rest of his life was
spent in London with a brief stay in Ireland, several interludes across Europe,
and his final four years in the town of Putney, located outside London. He seems
to have been at least as active in Whig politics as in classical and Biblical
philology, and he actually boasted of having mastered ten languages.
Altogether, he was said to have published almost two hundred books, pamphlets
and tracts pertaining to a large variety of issues as well as religion.
The word “freethinker” was actually invented by Bishop Berkeley to
describe Toland, and the modern intellectual historian David Berman describes
him as “perhaps the first professional freethinker.” As to be expected, he was
loathed by priests and clergymen alike, and remained intensely controversial
throughout his life. The Catholic satirist Jonathan Swift depicted him with
obvious irony as “the great oracle of the anti-Christians,” and upon his death he
was attacked in a scathing Tory obituary:
He had a smattering in many languages, was a critic in none; his style was
low, confused, and disagreeable . . . Dabling in controversy was his
Delight, in which he was rude, positive, and always in the wrong. His
being known in the world is owing chiefly to the Animadversions of
learned men upon his Writings among whom ‘twas a common trick in
their Disputes with one another, to charge their Adversary with an
agreement to, or resemblance of Mr. Toland’s Notions, as the greatest
infamy, and the surest criterion of error. [cited by Pierre des Maizeaux,
“Some Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Mr. John Toland,” included as
an Introduction to A Collection of Several Pieces of John Toland (May 26,
1722), pp. xc-xci.]
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Today, Toland is all but forgotten by most readers and scholars, but in retrospect
his intellectual contribution was quite remarkable, in fact far more interesting to
the modern freethinker than the likes of such detractors as Swift and Berkeley.
In 1691 Toland published his first book, The Tribe of Levi, an attack on
clericalism, and five years later, in 1696, at the age of twenty-seven, he published
his notorious and most famous book, Christianity Not Mysterious, in which he
challenged orthodox Christian assumptions with arguments derivative of
Locke’s theory of knowledge in Essay Concerning Human Understanding published
just six years earlier. Unexpectedly, his book provoked as many as fifty
published refutations and was condemned by Parliament in Ireland, where he
resided at the time. The local hangman was ordered to burn all copies, and an
order was issued for Toland’s immediate arrest. He fled to England, and later
authored two defenses, Apology for Mr. Toland in 1697, and five years afterwards
Vindicius Liberius, in which he described Christianity Not Mysterious as a youthful
indiscretion. He even went so far as to insist on his conformity to established
doctrine, but by most accounts it was indeed Christianity Not Mysterious that
launched England’s eighteenth century revision of deism, the first major
secularist “cause” in modern European history.
Toland had begun his preface to Christianity Not Mysterious with the
ambiguous proclamation, “Defenders of Truth, only for Truth’s sake, will be
found to be a small handful with respect to the numerous Partisans of Error.” [p.
iv] He had also argued that an avoidance of truth was in fact “the deplorable
Condition of our Age” relevant to “Divine Matters,” forcing too many
individuals either to “keep perpetual Silence” or to resort to fictitious identities
when expressing their views. His own purpose, he declared at the end of the
book was to “acknowledge no ORTHODOXY but the TRUTH,” presumably a
truth that can and should be tolerated by organized religion. “Wherever the
TRUTH is,” he asserted, “there must be also the CHURCH of God . . .” [p. 172—
caps in the original]
By implication Locke’s grasp of religion helped to confirm this necessity
as Toland explained in his book’s subtitle, a treatise Shewing That There is Nothing
in the Gospel Contrary to Reason, Nor Above It: And that no Christian Doctrine can be
properly call’d A Mystery. He first chapter demonstrated how reason is superior
to belief as the primary “Instrument” of the truth, since “there is nothing in the
Gospel contrary to Reason, nor above it.” [pp. 5-6] Toland declared, “Nothing in
Nature can come to our Knowledge but by . . . four means, viz. the Experience of
the Senses, the Experience of the Mind, and Human and Divine Revelation.” [p.
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28] He later reduced these four categories to two by proposing a simple Lockean
interaction between mind and experience on one hand, and divine revelation
grasped by transcendent human consciousness on the other. He warned that
skepticism results when these categories conflict with each other,” for no genuine
satisfaction is possible unless one can conceive what he believes.” [pp. 18, 32, 3637] In the simplest possible terms, he insisted, “There is nothing mysterious or
above reason in the Gospel,” thus by implication dispensing with the role of
miracles and much of Christian idolatry. [p. 66]
Toland’s use of Locke’s defense of materialism was suggested by the
resemblance between his title and that of Locke’s book, The Reasonableness of
Christianity, which was published just a year earlier. Their primary assumptions
were similar, and their differences a matter of degree. It seems, then, that Toland
took a stance only slightly more radical than Locke’s assumptions. Locke had
stretched materialist epistemology to a new but respectable extreme, and Toland
extended the argument even further by using Locke’s achievement to challenge
Christian assumptions still acceptable to Locke. Locke had assigned to Biblical
revelation the unique status of being above reason and the laws of logic, whereas
Toland eliminated this obvious escape clause, necessitating a new version of faith
divested of mystery supposedly impervious to rational analysis. Explaining
Biblical miracles on a strictly realistic basis, he rejected all aspects of mystery in
Christianity as a corruption of scriptures that had been adopted by church
authority well after Christ’s death. Though personally acquainted with Toland,
Locke did not appreciate being linked with this particular extension of his
theory, and, as to be expected, his effort to justify his assumptions relevant to this
issue led to his debate with Bishop Stillingfleet and still later his publication of
his influential Letter on Toleration in 1689. Toland actually took pleasure in
Locke’s disapproval and even boasted that he [Toland] had “made use of his
principles to support notions he [Locke] never dreamt of.” [Maizeaux, p. lxxv]
Toland also had the audacity to enlarge the concept of the soul to illustrate
the transparent operations of the human mind, arguing, “We certainly know as
much of the SOUL as we do of any thing else, if not more.” For in fact, he
insisted, “The Idea of the Soul . . . is every whit as clear and distinct as that of the
Body.” More specifically, he argued, “We form the clearest Conceptions of
Thinking, Knowing, Imagining, Willing, Hoping, Loving, and the like Operations
of the Mind. Similarly, all we do not know [about God] is the Subject [or essence]
wherein these Operations exist, ” so the same opportunity applies to the God
concept:
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As for GOD, we comprehend nothing better than his Attributes. We
know not, it’s true, the Nature of that eternal subject or Essence wherein
Infinite Goodness, Love, Knowledge, Power and Wisdom co-exist; but we
are not better acquainted with the real Essence of any of his Creatures. As
by the Idea and Name of GOD, we understand his known Attributes and
Properties, so we understand those of all things else by theirs; and we
conceive the one as clearly as we do the other. [pp 85-86]
Toland accordingly concluded,
Nothing is a Mystery, because we know not its Essence, since it appears
that it is neither knowable in itself, nor ever thought of by us. So that the
Divine Being himself cannot with more reason be accounted mysterious in
this Respect than the most contemptible of his Creatures. [ p. 87]
The question, therefore, was (and remains) how to account for the totality of
Biblical mysteries and miracles that presumably defy rational explanation. If all
experience is conceptual, no aspect of religion eludes this necessity any more
than the rest of experience.
As suggested by Toland’s title, Christianity not Mysterious, religious
mysteries might have been featured in the Old Testament, but they were rejected
in the New Testament when Christ told his disciples in Luke 10.24 of the need
“to see those things which you see, and have not seen them, and to hear those
things which you hear, and have not heard them.” Also relevant, Toland
continued, was Paul’s insistence in 2 Corinthians 3.12-18 that Christ’s “plainness
of speech” takes the veil off the face, permitting the truth to be observed and his
disclosure in Romans 16.25-26 that mysteries kept secret since the World began
were at last “made manifest.” Unlike Locke’s effort to grant Biblical truth special
validity, Toland argued that Christian Religion no longer had any “need of such
miserable Shifts and Artifices, there being nothing in it above or contrary to the
strictest Reason.” [p. 97]
Toland surveyed all the Biblical passages that specifically referred to
mysteries, using Christ’s Resurrection as one particular example. Then he
submitted to analysis parables, revelation, and finally miracles as the “last refuge
of mysteries.” Toland explained miraculous action as “something in itself
intelligible and possible, though the manner of doing it be extraordinary.” [pp.
145, 150] He also insisted that miracles cannot be contrary to reason because they
“served to confirm the authority of those that wrought it, to procure Attention to
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the Doctrines of the Gospel, or for the likewise and reasonable purposes.” [p.
147] Then again, he insisted that miracles cannot contain contradictions: “No
Miracle is contrary to Reason, for the Action must be intelligible, and the
Performance of it appear most easy of the Author of Nature.” Moreover, he
warned, “that all Miracles secretly perform’d or among that Party only to whose
Profit and Advantage the Belief of them turns, must be rejected as counterfeit
and false.” [p. 149] Obviously, his effort to justify their validity was at odds with
his own theoretical stance in later publications as well as the effort of later deists
to challenge the authenticity of all Biblical miracles without exception.
Toland risked public rejection once again in the final portion of his book
by comparing Christian mysteries with likely ancient pagan antecedents on a
variety of grounds: (1) that they used the same terms such as initiation and
perfection: (2) that their services required the same preparations (washing, fasting,
abstinence from certain kinds of meat); (3) that they kept their Mysteries secret;
(4) that they avoided speaking intelligibly before unbelievers; (5) that such goals
as the attainment of perfection were the same. Toland also explained that
Christian Mysteries were infrequent for perhaps two hundred years after Christ,
for example in the writings of the Apostles, but were later featured with
increasing emphasis on such practices as fastings, baptism, anointing, exorcisms,
omens, apparitions, consecrations, ceremonies, and so on. The same applied, he
suggested, to the hallowed practices of Popes, Cardinals, Patriarchs,
Archdeacons, Vicars, and so on, all of which “did strangely affect, stupefy, and
amaze the Minds of the ignorant people.” [p. 166] In the end, Toland argued-Our pretended Christians outdid all the Mysteries of the Heathens; for the
Honour of these might be destroyed by Discovery, or the babbling Tongue
of any initiated Person: But the new Mysteries were thus securely placed
above the Reach of all Sense and Reason. Nay, so jealous were the
CLERGY of their own Order, lest any of them should irreligiously unfold
those sublime Mysteries to the profanely inquisitive LAITY, that they
thought fit to put it as much out of the Power of the HOLY Tribe itself, as
out of ours, to understand them; and so it continues, in a great measure, to
this day. [p. 169]
Toland obviously had the Catholic Church in mind with this final sally, but his
argument also applied to the Church of England and all established religion at
least to a certain extent. Elsewhere in the text he rejected scholastic philosophy,
but in several contexts he also expressed his doubts regarding ancient Greek
philosophy including academic skepticism. [see pp. 64, 96, 121, 123, 154, and
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164] Obviously he continued to adhere to his own version of God at the time and
did his best to defend the Bible not as a source of revelation that transcends
rational truths as emphasized by Locke, but as a holy document that effectively
merged revelation and rational judgment. In his conclusion Toland insisted,
For I acknowledge no ORTHODOXY but the TRUTH; and, I’m sure,
where-ever the TRUTH is, there must be also the CHURCH, of God I
mean, and not any human Faction or Policy. [p. 172—caps. in the original]
Simply enough, Toland assumed that whenever church doctrine deviates from
the truth, the necessary modifications can and ought to be sought in church
doctrine itself. On the next page, however, he conceded:
Some good Men may be apt to say, that, supposing my Opinion never so
true, it may notwithstanding occasion much harm; because when People
find themselves imposed upon in any part of Religion, they are ready to
call the whole in question. [p. 173]
And this would seem exactly what happened in the case of Toland himself in his
later books. In fact he could not have more effectively anticipated his later
rejection of Christianity and finally even religion itself in its entirety.
In 1698 Toland published Life of John Milton, as what might have seemed a
relatively uncontroversial project. However, he used the book to justify modern
misinterpretations of Christianity by declaring that numerous forgeries had been
written about Christ even in ancient times. Not surprisingly, he once again
provoked widespread public reaction among orthodox Christians supportive of
Biblical authenticity against all detractors. In defense of his argument, Toland
published Amyntor with an extended list of over seventy apocryphal texts
rejected by the early church fathers. By calling attention to this neglected issue,
Toland enlarged the controversy stirred by Blount’s critique of Biblical
authenticity, helping to prolong the negative interpretation of the Bible that
culminated with Paine’s The Age of Reason, published in 1794, as well as David
Strauss’s The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, published in Germany in 1835.
In 1704 Toland published two letters, “To a Gentleman in Holland” and
“Motion Essential to Matter,” to defend his Christian status by declaring his
rejection of Spinoza’s version of materialism that was at the time almost
universally criticized for being atheistic. His critique would seem to somewhat
aligned him with Spinoza’s orthodox critics. However, he obviously drew upon
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Spinoza’s philosophy in his Letters to Serena, published in the same year, and in
his letter, Socinianism Truly Stated, published just a year later, he was actually
willing to declare his support for Spinoza’s philosophy. In other words as
documented by four of his publications, he can be said to have actually
converted within a single year from an irregular Christian to a pantheist aligned
with Spinoza. In fact, it was Toland himself who coined the word pantheist to
describe any philosopher inclusive of Spinoza in his willingness to identify God
with the universe itself. French authors adopted this term and soon extended its
use to include the noun pantheism with reference to the belief of pantheists. Both
words obtained currency a few decades after Spinoza’s death though Spinoza
himself had apparently never used them.
At about the same time Toland also fell under the influence of an earlier
version of pantheism advocated by the Italian philosopher Bruno, who had been
burned at the stake in 1600, a full century earlier, for his materialist assumptions
inspired by Democritus and Epicurus. In 1713, Toland and his brother-in-law W.
Morehead apparently collaborated in translating Bruno’s ethical tract, The
Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, and Toland himself provided a translation of
the introduction to Bruno’s Infinite Universe and Innumerable Worlds that was
included in his posthumous text, A Collection of Several Pieces, published in 1726.
The combined pantheist vision of both Bruno and Spinoza thus served to offset
the contemporary influence of Locke, Newton, and others in inspiring Toland’s
final materialist perspective in both Letters to Serena and Pantheisticon. Obviously,
his very title Pantheisticon suggested a new and more cumbersome variant of the
word pantheist, suggesting its purpose as a “lexicon” of Pantheism.
In 1701, Toland’s publication of both Art of Governing by Parties and Anglia
Libera led to his friendship with Sophia Charlotte, the wife of King Frederick I of
Prussia and the mother of Frederick II (the “Great”). As an amazing coincidence,
just as Sophia became friends with Toland, arguably the inventor of deism in its
latest and most advanced version, her son Frederick became a close friend of
Voltaire, who can be said to have almost single-handedly brought Toland’s
modernization of deism from England to France. Moreover, Leibniz, the
dominant German philosopher at the time, was also a frequent visitor of
Frederick I and Sophia’s court, where it seems that both he and Toland often met
with the Queen in discussing a variety of religious issues from what must have
been what might have been considered a radical perspective. Toland and
Leibniz continued to exchange letters for years afterwards, and their influence
upon each other is said to be discernible in the later writings of both. In 1704
Toland authored Letters to Serena, addressed to both Sophia and Leibniz (”our
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common Friend, who alone philosophizes at Court”) as well as two unidentified
friends in London and Amsterdam. He chose his title of the book to suggest a
polite exchange of epistles with an inquisitive debutante rather than six extended
essays derivative of sustained discussion upon religion with both Queen Sophia
and Leibniz, the most distinguished philosopher in continental Europe at the
time. Here in Toland’s most ambitious text upon religion, he sought to articulate
his doubts about Christianity that had mounted over the preceding eight years.
The six extended letters inclusive of Toland’s 55-page Preface might seem
loosely connected. However, careful examination discloses that they provide an
extended logical critique of Christianity and religious belief in general. The
radical implications of the project as a whole conveyed far greater disbelief than
Christianity Not Mysterious, as becomes obvious through sustained analysis. The
first letter, “The Origin and Force of Prejudices,” focused on religion’s
dependence on superstition. The second, “The History of the Soul’s
Immortality,” rejected the concept of an afterlife. And the third, “The Origin of
Idolatry,” did the same relevant to Christian religious conventions apparently
obtained from earlier religions. The final two letters were supposedly critiques
of Spinoza based on post-Newtonian cosmology, and might accordingly seem
irrelevant, especially because they were specifically addressed to a friend in
London. The loose connection between the theoretical emphasis of these final
two letters and the historical emphasis of the three preceding ones might
accordingly seem arbitrary except that both of the theoretical letters almost
furtively shifted from their supposed topics to more basic considerations, the
first culminating as an attack on the belief in God’s creation of the universe and
the second as an attack on God’s very existence except as a total outsider to the
very universe He supposedly created. Understood in this light, the five letters
offered in sequence for perhaps the first time in the modern history of western
philosophy a thorough if loosely organized challenge to the validity of religion
and Christianity in particular without going so far as to suggest atheism as an
alternative. Somehow, Toland’s perspective both exceeded deism and fell short
of outright atheism.
In Letter I, described as “The Origin and Force of Prejudices,” Toland
described the harmful impact of orthodox religious assumptions on all aspects of
human behavior. He listed in sequence the “successive Growth and Increase of
Prejudices thro every step of our Lives, and proving that all the Men in the
World are join’d in the same Conspiracy to deprave the reason of every
individual Person.” [p. xxxiii] As he explained, this hurtful influence effectively
begins with the birth process itself: “The very Midwife hands us into the World
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with superstitious Ceremonies,” then went on to mention “ignorant Women of
the meanest Vulgar, who infuse into us their Errors with their Milk,” followed by
“ignorant Servants, whose chiefest Entertainments are Discourses of Fairys,
Elves, Witchcrafts . . or such other chimerical Doings.” This is followed, he
argued, by an early education that infects children with Daemons, Nymphs, etc.,
followed by later education when “We greedily devour the Poets, Orators,
Mythologists, committing great Extracts of their Fictions to our memory . . .
whereby . . . we swallow the Poison of their Errors with inexpressible Pleasure,
and lay a large Foundation of future Credulity.” [pp. 4-6]
Worse yet, he insisted, is one’s college education, since “The University is
the ultimately the most fertile Nursery of Prejudices, whereof the greatest is, that
we think there to learn every thing, when in reality we are taught nothing.” He
warned, “the Professors (right or wrong) must accommodate all things to the
Laws and the Religion of the Country” and either make us “trust too little or too
much to our senses, or amus[e] us with illusory Abstractions and Subtiltys.”
Also, he argued, theology are taught to speak “a barbarous Jargon which
commonly has no Signification,” and learn “to treat of very ordinary Matters in
very extraordinary Terms.” [p. 7] Finally in our full maturity we must submit to
the Orthodox Clergy who seek “not to undeceive, but to retain the rest of the
People in their Mistakes.” Those of us who cannot accept received dogma, he
suggested, learn the necessity of hypocrisy perhaps best described as prudence:
“If by some lucky chance we should happen to be undeceiv’d, yet the prevailing
Power of Interest will make us hypocritically (or, if you please, prudently) to
pretend the contrary, for fear of losing our Fortunes, Quiet, Reputation, or
Lives.” [pp. 4-9]
In Letter II, described as the "History of the Soul’s Immortality among the
Heathens,” Toland argued that the Christian promise of an afterlife was
anticipated by a variety of religions that preceded Christianity by many
centuries. As explained in the Preface, he sought to prove that life after death
originated as a prehistoric notion “taken up by the mob” rather than the
invention of any particular philosopher or theologian. It was only later that
more sophisticated apologists sought to give it credibility. [pp. xl-xli] In the first
letter itself, Toland suggested the possibility that the immortal-soul concept
might have taken root as the “opinion” of one or more individuals preceding
classical civilization—more than likely the innovation of a single individual
whose identity cannot possibly be ascertained in modern times:
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To Persons less knowing and unprejudic’d than SERENA, it would sound
strange perhaps to hear me speak of the Soul’s Immortality, as of an
Opinion, which, like some others in Philosophy, had a Beginning at a
certain time, or from a certain Author who was the Inventor thereof, and
which was favour’d or oppos’d as Peoples Persuasion, Interest, or
Inclination led ‘em. [21]
Based on the Old Testament, Toland rejected any possibility of an ancient Jewish
source, and instead proposed the likelihood that it had first been suggested by
Egyptian priests, Chaldaean Magi, and/or Indian Bramins. Among these three
he rejected the Chaldaean option for a relative lack of evidence, and, partly based
on Herodotus and Macrobius’ accounts of Egyptian religion, he attributed the
Indian version of eternal life to cultural diffusion brought from Egypt by the
largely mythical king Sesostris at an earlier time.
Toland also mentioned Egyptian funeral rites that involved embalming
dead bodies to preserve them into the indefinite future as possibly having
encouraged the belief in immortal souls:
Their way of burying, you know, was by embalming the dead Bodys,
which they deposited in subterranean Grots, where they continu’d intire
for thousands of Years, so that before any notion of separate or immortal
Souls, the common Language was, that such a one was under ground, that
he was carry’d over the River Acherubsia by CHARON . . . and laid
happily to rest in the Elysian Fields, which were the common Burial-place
near Memphis. [p. 45]
Toland also quoted the first century, B.C. Greek historian Diodorus Suculus to
the effect that Greek society rejected Egyptian assumptions about the “Honor of
the Just and Disgrace of the Wicked” confirmed by their ”fictions of hell” as an
extension of life after death:
But among the Egyptians, the Punishment of the Wicked and the
Recompence of the Good, not being contain’d in Fables, but exhibited to
our Eyes, each Party is every day put in mind of their dutys, and by this
Custom there grows the best and most useful Reformation of manners.”
[pp. 49-50]
The essential benefit of the notion of eternal bliss was the encouragement of
obedience and ethical behavior, and the mythology of an afterlife that separated
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the good from the bad had been of such unique value, Toland suggested, that its
abandonment presumably risked the fate of any particular civilization, for
example ancient Greece after the Age of Pericles.
As for the identity of the individual who first transcribed to written prose
the suggestion of an immortal soul, Toland cited Cicero, St. Augustine and others
to the effect that the early sage-philosopher Pherecydes, a contemporary of
Thales, would seem to have been the most likely author in his text Pentemychos
(or Hetamychos according to some ancient scholars), which later came to be
recognized as the first prose transcription of mythology in ancient Greece. On
the other hand, Toland mentioned the possible input of Pythagoras, supposedly
a disciple of Pherecydes who was able to travel throughout the region to
acquaint himself with pagan customs.
Toland quoted a variety of sources to demonstrate that Thales,
Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, and Plato had been either directly or indirectly inspired
by Pherecydes’ notion of an immortal soul, but he also emphasized that
Epicurean and even Pythagoras himself were willing to reject the notion of an
afterlife, as did Pliny with his argument that “the State of all Men is the same
after the last Day of their Life, as before the first.” [pp. 56-7, 64] The best
explanation, Toland suggested, was that most ancient philosophers—perhaps
almost all of them—necessarily resorted to the prudent expedient of adhering to
two contradictory doctrines, one for the masses and the other for fellow
philosophers able to share in promoting this deception:
For most of the Philosophers had two sorts of Doctrins, the one internal
and the other external, or the one private and the other publick; the latter
to be indifferently communicated to all the World, and the former only
very cautiously to their best Friends, or to some few others capable of
receiving it, and that wou’d not make any ill use of the same. {pp. 56-57]
Proposed in this context as an almost incidental observation, this stance became
essential to Toland’s perspective as a freethinker in his final years. The
implications seems obvious that the idea of an afterlife and other such aspects of
Christian dogma do provide useful--even essential—mental benefits for many
individuals as well as society at large, thus obliging prudent philosophers to
keep their more heretical assumptions to themselves. The argument somewhat
resembled Averroes’ use of the “double truth” in granting the expression of
orthodox theory in order to justify the expression of otherwise unacceptable
ideas. Toland’s more variable approach, first suggested by Cicero based on
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Aristotle’s practices, more simply involved the choice between consistent
materialism and popular myths that appease the fears and concerns of ordinary
people.
Surprisingly, Toland neglected to mention perhaps the most striking
example of this double truth in ancient religion. In Pierre Bayle’s Historical and
Critical Dictionary, published in 1702 and undoubtedly familiar to Toland, a long
footnote to the story of the ancient Chinese prophet called Foe, who identified
himself as a god and thereby attracted a flock of 80,000 believers by having
taught the usual wisdom to be expected of such a divine. When he died,
however, Foe confessed to his closest disciples that he had not told the truth,
which was simply “that there was nothing to seek, nor anything to put one’s
hopes on, except the nothingness and the vacuum that is the principle of all
things.” According to Bayle, Foe’s disciples were horrified by this death-bed
revelation and decided among themselves to continue teaching his original
truths as “exterior” wisdom for the benefit of the majority of his flock, but to
cultivate among themselves and their equals exactly the opposite “interior”
wisdom that Foe had ventured to confess at the time of his death. [Bayle, 289-90]
Toland’s emphasis on the double truth, first mentioned in his second letter to
Serena and later in both Clidophorous and Pantheisticon toward the end of his
career bore a remarkable similarity to this story of Foe, but with an emphasis on
the task of secular philosophers rather than any religious prophet.
In Letter III to Serena, “The Origin of Idolatry, and Reasons for
Heathenism,” Toland argued that Christianity has accumulated so many barbaric
rituals and practices that it has predictably degenerated from Christ’s original
teachings to an essentially pagan ideology that could only serve the convictions
of the “common people”:
. . . Notwithstanding the nice Distinctions of supreme and absolute, of
inferior and relative Worship; all the common People are downright gross
idolaters; and as to the multitude of their Observations, the Impostures or
Power of their Clergy in the places where this Worship is established, the
Superstitions of the whole World put together woud, in respect of them,
make a very easy and tolerable Religion. [p, 123]
In other words, the reduction of religion to nothing more than sheer idolatry
uncontaminated by doubts and inconvenient scientific findings (such as
Anaxagoras’ discovery that the moon “had but a borrowed light from the Sun”)
has always served well in meeting the needs of most worshippers, to say nothing
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of rulers dependent on patriotic obedience as guaranteed by religious belief.
Toland went so far as to suggest that this shared agenda has persisted from the
very beginning as sustained collaboration between priests and rulers:
Moreover, there was not wanting sometimes a mutual Compact between
the Prince and the Priest, whereby the former oblig’d himself to secure all
these Advantages to the latter, if he in return would preach up his
absolute Power over the People, on whose well-meaning Understandings
he coud make what Impressions he pleas’d at any time. [p. 104]
In retrospect what seems remarkable is the enormous assortment of rites and
practices listed by Toland that were borrowed and revised from one society to
the next through cultural diffusion. To illustrate his point, for example, Toland
recorded numerous supposedly original rites and practices of Christianity
acquired from ancient Egyptian religion:
. . . We may remark that almost every Point of those superstitious and
idolatrous Religions are in these or grosser Circumstances reviv’d by
many Christians in our Western Parts of the World, and by all the Oriental
Sects: as Sacrifices, Incense, Lights, Images, Lustrations, Feasts, Musick,
Altars, Pilgrimages, Fastings, religious Celibacy and Habits,
Consecrations, Divinations, Sorcerys, Omens, Presages, Charms, the
Worship of Dead Men and Women, the Continual Canonization of more,
Mediators between God and Men, good and evil Daemons, guardian
Genus’s, Male and Female tutelary Powers to whom they dedicate
Temples, appoint Feasts and peculiar Modes of Worship, not only
cantoning all Places among ‘em but likewise the Cure of Diseases, and the
disposal of every thing which Men are glad to want or enjoy. [127-28]
Egyptian practices that Toland neglected to include in his Christian list included
traditional factors such as a hierarchy among Priests and Priestesses, the use of
religious colleges to improve their education, and religious Houses to provide
them with maintenance as well as an abundance of sacred books and strictures
insistent on sexual abstinence. [p. 126]
Toland maintained that most of this assortment of practices had been
ignored if not discouraged by Christ himself, only to be adopted by his later
worshippers anyway. Toland’s response was indignant: “But how little right
these have to the Denomination of Christians, who defend the very things which
JESUS CHRIST went about to destroy.” This stark revision, Toland argued,
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resulted from the emphasis on enforcing religious acquiescence at the expense of
Christ’s more stringent version of the truth: “In plain and proper Terms this is
Antichristianism, nothing being more diametrically repugnant to the Doctrin of
Christ . . .” [p. 128] Resulting from this collective effort, much the same level of
unintelligible absurdity has resulted comparable to that of pagan religions,
. . . The plain Institution of Jesus Christ cou’d degenerate into the most
absurd Doctrins, unintelligible Jargon, ridiculous Practices, and
inexplicable Mysterys and . . . almost in every corner of the world Religion
and Truth cou’d be chang’d into Superstition and Priestcraft. [p. 130]
And thus Toland’s disdain for religious idolatry supplemented his rejection of
both religious conventions as described in his first letter and the pious
expectation of an afterlife as described in his second letter.
In Letter IV, Toland might seem to have reversed his stance supportive of
Spinoza’s version of pantheism in light of recent findings in astronomy as well as
Bruno’s earlier version of pantheism that he did not specifically identify in this
context. Toland argued, “It is not my present Design to confute all his
[Spinoza’s] Errors one by one, but to show that his whole System is altogether
groundless, which at one stroke destroys whatever is built upon it. [p. 139]
Toward this end, he quoted Spinoza’s wording on motion in his Ethic, “Motion
and Rest are the Causes of all the Diversitys among Bodys, thence proceeds the
distinction of particular Bodys,” but then went on to argue that Spinoza’s failure
to define motion on a more inclusive basis led to his inability to explain God’s
role as the first cause of the universe:
I say, having given no count how Matter came to be mov’d or Motion
comes to be continu’d, not allowing God as first Mover, neither proving
nor supposing Motion to be an Attribute (but the contrary) nor indeed
explaining what Motion is, he [Spinoza] cou’d not possibly show how the
Diversity of particular Bodys is reconcilable to the Unity of Substance, or
to the Sameness of Matter in the whole Universe; wherefore I may safely
conclude that his System is intirely precarious and without any sort of
ground, undigested and unphilosophical. [pp. 144, 147]
This categorical rejection of Spinoza’s theory seems excessive to the modern
reader, even more so in light of Toland’s concession in his fifth letter,
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I question not but you’ll allow that Motion ought to enter into the
Definition of Matter, no less than Extension or Solidity. But if you
demand the Definition of Motion it self, I answer that I cannot give it, nor
any other man, tho never so able; not that we know it the less for all this,
but on the contrary because we know it better than anything which is
capable of Definition. [pp. 226-27]
Here Toland admitted that he himself was unable to define on an a priori basis
the principle of motion as a transition from one site (or context) to another,
thereby acknowledging all the limitations he had previously disdained in
Spinoza’s theory derivative his inability to explain God’s role as the first mover.
Toland expressed his appreciation for Spinoza’s “lucky thoughts” in
having effectively disposed of Descartes’ “ingenious Philosophical Romance
based on the supposition that “God [had] at the beginning . . . “given a shake to
the lazy Lump from which His Matters of the first, second, and third Elements
successively existed.” [pp. 133, 152] On the other hand, Toland felt that Spinoza’s
principal deficiency was that he left his task incomplete, necessitating an even
more radical explanation of the universe as an essentially physical realm devoid
of God’s involvement at all levels of manifestation inclusive of both God’s initial
creation of the universe and God’s full identity with the universe (i.e. pantheism)
as proposed by Spinoza.
The crux of Toland’s rejection of Spinoza’s theory at this point was that
Spinoza supposedly neglected to take into account the interaction between
matter and motion. Inspired by the recent findings of Newton and Halley in
astronomy, Toland expanded the principle to explain all existence. In other
words, he argued that the universe involves both extension and motion and that
the two are in fact interdependent: “I have made it very clear, that Motion is but
Matter under a certain Consideration.” [pp. l-li] Spinoza’s simplistic emphasis
upon matter at the expense of motion was thus supposedly deficient both
relevant to all local contexts (e.g. atoms and molecules as understood today) and
relevant to the universe as a whole at its very inception (e.g. the so-called Big
Bang, again as understood today). All change, Toland went on to explain,
necessarily involves both:
We agree on every side that the perpetual Changes in Matter are the
Effects of Motion, which produces an Infinity of different Figures,
Mixtures, and sensible Qualitys. But we must distinguish between local
Motion and the moving Force or Action; for local Motion is only a Change

16
of Situation, or the successive Application of the same Body to the
respective Parts of several other bodys; so that this Motion is nothing
different from the Body it self . . . [p. 140]
It might seem self-evident to the modern layman that local motion is an intrinsic
feature of matter essential to its very existence. However, by sheer serendipity
Toland anticipated Einstein’s theory of relativity involving the interaction
between mass and energy (energy equals mass times the speed of light squared)
supportive of today’s scientific version of creation that the universe began as an
enormous eruption of sheer energy described as the Big Bang. Granted, mass as
described by modern physics is not exactly Toland’s concept of matter nor is
motion exactly the same as energy, but the interplay between these antithetical
categories--thing versus action—is similar, especially in light of today’s version
of cosmology based on the assumption that all energy released by the big bang
converts to mass that ultimately accumulates in black holes. Moreover, needless
to say, the concept of “local motion” suggests a microscopic realm of quantum
mechanics distinct from the cosmic dynamics of a Big Bang.
Toland actually used the word hypothesis in proposing his theory as
opposed to Spinoza’s use of the words, “gratuitous suppositions,” [p. 153] and
he specifically applied the word hypothesis to suggest a new version of First
Cause rooted in motion:
Whoever then goes about to explain by their first Causes the Origin of the
World, its present Mechanism, or the Affections of Matter, must begin
with the first Cause of Motion: for no manner of Variety is included in the
bare Idea of Extension, nor any Cause of Alteration; and seeing it is Action
alone that can possibly produce any Change in Extension, this Action or
Principle of Motion must be well clear’d and establish’d, or the System
must quickly be found defective. If it be only taken for granted, the
System will be but a Hypothesis, but if prov’d and explain’d, then we may
expect to find some greater Certitude than hitherto in natural Philosophy.
[p. 141]
Both Plato and Aristotle had referred to the concept of hypothesis, Plato having
done so in his dialogue, “Protagoras,” suggesting the possibility of its earlier use
among the Sophists. In any case, Toland specifically applied the term to ideas
taken for granted as opposed to confirmed propositions. More specifically—
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I hold then that Motion is essential to Matter, that is to say, as inseparable
from its Nature as Impenetrability or Extension, and that it ought to make
a part of its definition. . . . I deny that Matter is or ever was an inactive
dead Lump in absolute Repose, a lazy and unwieldy thing . . . [p. 159]
In other words, the entire universe has never been a “stuff” set in motion,
suggesting the possibility that God’s role has been redundant at least as the
originator of such a universe, as more or less conceded by such modern
cosmologists as Stephen Hawking and Steven Weinberg.
Toland concluded his fourth letter to Serena with an obligatory concession
to the orthodox belief in God—“that God at the beginning endu’d [the universe]
with Action as well as with Extension; and those who believe it eternal, may as
well believe it eternally active, as eternally divisible . . .” [p. 161] Here Toland
seems to have backtracked on his earlier stance, but he retrospectively disclosed
in his fifth letter his conviction that “all the Matter in Nature, every Part and
Parcel of it, has bin ever in motion, and can never be otherwise,” a principle that
continues to deserve serious consideration relevant to our particular universe. [p.
167] In any case, Toland insisted his simple purpose was “to prove mater [sic]
necessarily active as well as extended, . . . but not to meddle in the Disputes
which others may raise about its Original or Duration.” [p. 161] He also insisted
the inception of the universe was basically amoral, irrelevant to ethics. Somehow
an enormous discharge of energy (he called it motion) initiated a grand transition
to mass without the “fatal consequences” that a personal God (or more satanic
figure) could be blamed as “the author of all the Wickedness of Nature . . . the
Tongue of a lying Witness, the Hand and Dagger of a Murderer.” [p. 157]
In his fifth and final letter, “Motion Essential to Matter,” Toland enlarged
the materialistic perspective suggested in Letter IV. Just as Letter IV was his
shortest chapter, thirty-one pages in length, Letter V was by far his longest,
seventy-six pages in length. What might be described as the hidden agenda of
Letter IV entailed the dubious validity of creationism as a theory, and the hidden
agenda of Letter V went to the very root of this consideration by exploring the
presumably unthinkable possibility of a godless universe. Here his vision of the
“truth” was perhaps as close to uncompromising atheism as at any time in his
career, but without his having altogether ruled out the possible existence of God.
One suspects this might have been through his prudent effort avoid conflict with
religious believers who were unable to make the needed concessions to accept
such a possibility.
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Toland had no problem explaining Newton’s theory of systems within
systems: “Vortexes, or Whirlpools of Matter . . . subdivided into other Systems
greater of less, which depend on one another, as every one on the whole . . .”
[182-3, 185, 187-88, 194, and 217] However, he confessed that in the final analysis
he was not able to define motion except as an occurrence intrinsic to matter and
its generation by means of action. [pp. 226, 209-12, 230]. Even what might seem
at rest manifests motion as the product of action, he argued, through the
interactive resistance between two motions:
Since Rest therefore is but a certain Determination of the Motion of Bodys,
a real Action of Resistance between equal Motions, ‘tis plain that this is no
absolute Inactivity among Bodys, but only a relative Repose with respect
to other Bodys that sensibly change their place. [p. 199]
Inanimate objects accordingly remain the same over a period of time because the
“action of resistance among equal motions” imposes temporary stasis, for
example the fixed position among passengers on a boat taking them across a
body of water. Toland did not mention the resemblance, but a comparable
resistance to entropy can be applied to biology in Darwinian terms both in the
prolongation of individual life and in the prolonged existence of any particular
species. Durability is necessarily temporary and results from a viable standoff
among conflicting actions until death occurs and the cycle of life may be said to
have completed itself relevant to whatever has completed this transition. This is
when “action” comes to an end both for the individual and for the species as a
whole upon its extinction. Of course Toland did not try to extend his argument
to biology on this basis, but its implication seems obvious in modern terms.
What primarily concerned Toland relevant to this principle was the
“vulgar Error of absolute Rest,” and he proposed on this basis the corollary that
the final and most questionable aspect of the God concept was His explanation as
a fixed source of “motion from elsewhere.” Toland also argued that the
assumption of creation from total non-existence to total existence is impossible,
since nothing is added or subtracted as insisted by Bruno. [203, 214, 216]
Moreover, Toland suggested, the God concept becomes redundant if the eternal
universe entails perpetual motion without beginning or end. In effect he implied
without specifically declaring that there is no need for a creator if matter is
perpetually active without beginning or end:
. . . Seeing that every Part of Matter is prov’d to be always in motion, you
shou’d conclude that Motion is essential to the Whole, for the same reason
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that you think Extension to be so [as did Spinoza] because every Part is
extended. [p. 204]
Toland’s conclusion was simple enough:
And as for the Infinity of Matter, it only excludes, what all reasonable and
good Men must exclude, an extended corporeal God, but not a pure Spirit
or immaterial Being. [p. 236]
Toland thus argued in so many words that a tangible and intrusive God is
simply not possible. Indeed, God can only exist as an immaterial spirit—a
presence without any direct impact on the universe, much like the helpless gods
dismissively suggested by Epicurus and Lucretius as captives in their own
garden. If so, such a God is necessarily irrelevant to human behavior and all else
that manifests itself in the physical universe. In effect Toland’s argument seemed
atheistic but not specifically declared. He used logic to force readers to recognize
the likelihood that God does not exist, but without articulating this conclusion
himself.
Toland’s presumably thoughtful advice to a bright young lady not
identified by name (in fact the queen of Prussia) had turned into nothing less
than a five-tier manifesto that cleared away a thicket of uncritical piety to justify
the outright rejection of the orthodox God concept in and of itself. However, he
did not go so far as to assert this final necessity, and the most basic question
remained whether it could be ascertained with any confidence either that a
personal God exists or does not exist. Toland seems to have avoided confronting
this choice for the next sixteen years, until two years preceding his death, and
even then he fell short of fully declaring himself. During this nearly two-decade
interlude he addressed issues of Biblical exegesis, Catholicism, the citizenship of
Jews, and a large variety of denominational and domestic political issues, but
nothing directly relevant to the issue of God’s existence or lack thereof.
In 1720, two years before his death, Toland published Clidophorus (39 pp.)
and Pantheisticon (appx. 80 pp.), both of which argued that religion is effectively
a collective fabrication but fulfills genuine emotional needs of the vast majority
of the populace. He suggested that the so-called “esoteric” truths acknowledged
by philosophers among themselves are inescapably different from the so-called
“exoteric” mythology among with the public at large. In Clidophorus, he sought
to summarize this double task among ancient philosophers, and in Pantheisticon
he suggested how it occurs in modern times and should even be enlarged.
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As well as Maizeaux, Toland’s friend and first biographer, could recollect,
Pantheisticon was published in 1720, while Clidophorus was published later in the
year with three unrelated texts in Tetradymus. As a result, Pantheisticon has been
considered Toland’s final and most radical freethought testament, while
Clidophorus has been consigned to almost complete obscurity, perhaps cited but
not read. This is a mistake, since Clidiphorus was at least as important in Toland’s
intellectual development as Letters to Serena. Moreover, Clidophorus could well
have been written at just about the same time as Pantheisticon, explaining more
thoroughly Toland’s supposedly final assessment in the latter text. Moreover,
the imbalance between the two in their depth of information suggests the
advantage of first interpreting Clidophorus’s basic assumptions followed by his
relatively superficial conclusion in Pantheisticon.
It is also to be noted that Toland authored Pantheisticon in a Latin version
that was finally translated into English in 1751, three decades after his death.
Toland may well have felt that Clidophorus was safe to publish in English because
it referred to arguments many of which were over a thousand years old, whereas
Pantheisticon, relevant to current assumptions was in effect better and more safely
expressed in Latin, at least during his lifetime. Yet the link between the two texts
seems close enough that neither can be fully understood except in light of the
other.
As already indicated, Toland’s basic thesis in Clidophorus was that classical
poets, philosophers, and theologians commonly expressed their ideas at two
levels: (1) as complex and strictly interpretive arguments intended for initiates
and fully educated “esoteric” readers, and (2) as lively but simplistic narratives
accessible to “exoteric” uneducated readers who were incapable of grasping
truths except as useful fables. Toland seems to have been inspired by Cicero’s
distinction in De Finibus Bonorum, between popular and more carefully wrought
texts by Aristotle and his followers who seemed at times to have dealt with
issues from entirely different perspectives:
Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one
popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the
other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of
note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of
inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main body of their doctrine
there is no divergence. [Book 5, sect. 5]
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As so-called “Acroatics,” Aristotle’s unfinished lecture notes were said to have
been kept fully accessible to his students, providing a more inclusive perspective
than his published lectures which were intended for a popular audience. Citing
the explanation of the second-century Latin grammarian, Aulus Gellius, Toland
also indicated that Aristotle himself also more or less consigned politics and
rhetoric to the Exoteric category, and nature and dialectical analysis to the
Acroatic category. [p. 74]
Expanding Cicero’s brief definition, Toland identified as “exoteric”
doctrine the orthodox truths addressed to the multitude at large; and he
identified as “esoteric” doctrine the inner truths whose general diffusion possibly
disruptive of social cohesion. Exoteric doctrine he described as being “external”
in the sense that it could be shared by all; on the other hand he described Esoteric
doctrine as being “internal” in the sense that it was necessarily covert,
representing an inner and more risky explanation best left to the experts.
Toland also used both the Jewish Talmud and Christ’s parables to
illustrate esoteric insistence only slightly less dramatic than the Chinese prophet
Fo’s disclosure upon his death as recounted by Bayle. For example, Toland
quoted Rabbi Hillel in response to a question about the nature of God, “If I knew
it, my son, yet I shou’d-be farr from telling you my thoughts about it.” [sic--p.
90] Toland also quoted Paul’s explanation to the same effect, “We speak wisdom
among them that are perfect,” (p. 78, see Corinthians 2.6). By implication
followers less than perfect could be provided with comfortable “truths” inferior
to genuine wisdom. Needless to say, all of these examples in the context of
religion suggested an adherence to spiritual insight rather than materialist
knowledge Toland considered the final truth.
Usually, as in Homer’s epic and Egyptian religion, exoteric and esoteric
truths were harmonious, both simple and more complex, for example with
Aphrodite having been both a beautiful goddess and the symbol of love and
beauty. However, esoteric and exoteric truths necessarily became “duplicitous”
(i.e. doubled) when the multitude was led to accept a superficial interpretation
incompatible with a somewhat different and possibly more elusive underlying
truth. For, as Toland explained in the first sentence of his book, “To know the
TRUTH is one thing, to tell it to others is another thing: and as all men profess to
admire the first, so few men practice the last as they ought.” [p. 63]
Toland also warned that scoundrels now and again took advantage of this
unavoidable disparity:
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Some cunning persons . . . boasted of a superior and supernatural
knowledge, not subject to the rules of Criticism, nor a proper object of the
Understanding. Nay, they went a greater length, openly maintaining that
it was lawful to ly for the public good; so that the common people (said
they) being incapable of reflection ought to be manag’d by guile, and to be
deluded by agreeable fables into the obedience of their Governors. [p. 64]
Among a large variety of leaders Toland mentioned as having resorted to this
manipulative practice were the Egyptian king Mnevis, Zoroaster, Pythagoras,
Minos, Mahomet, as presumably insisted by five contemporaries Toland was
able to mention by name. With obvious irony he vigorously rejected their
accusation, explaining that Moses’ laws were “truely divine, without any
mixture of weakness or folly.” However, by mentioning the possibility of doubt,
he obviously suggested Frederick II’s supposed earlier accusation that Moses,
Jesus and Mohammed were the world’s three principal impostors, an accusation
Toland himself was said to have featured earlier in his writings. Whatever
Toland’ feelings about the sacred status of Moses, he deplored the excesses
encouraged by religious fraud, especially when enforced by homicidal means:
. . . perceiving that what was built upon fraud, cou’d onely be supported
by force, they made it capital [i.e. a capital offense] to question their
dictates, and highly disreputable so much as to examine, let alone to
doubt of them. The Priests, for their own interest, were not wanting any
where to promote such penal law; and the Magistrates (partly thro
Superstition proceding from their ignorance; and partly thro Policy, to
grasp at more power than the laws allow’d, by the assistance of the
Priests) have been commonly very ready to enforce those laws.
This secularization of religious oppression could be observed in the medieval
and Spanish inquisitions, but also in the conduct of modern warfare, when
patriotism is too often reinforced by increased religious devotion. In response to
this collective assault upon the truth, according to Toland, a predictable duplicity
becomes essential among otherwise honest philosophers. [pp. 63-66] Toland
went on to explain that this choice necessarily divides authors and philosophers
who pursue intellectual harmlessness from those who risk expressing more
dangerous truths at odds with received assumptions.
Toland thereupon sought to demonstrate that the exoteric/esoteric
distinction was relevant to all ancient philosophy and religion. His most obvious
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examples were the “secret discipline” of Pythagoras as well as Plato ‘s
assessment in Timaeus, “To discover the creator and parent of the Universe was
difficult: but to explain his nature to the Vulgar, impossible.” [p. 90] Toland
went so far as to describe the Academic philosophers without identifying them
by name, as having been the “true followers of Plato,” at least to this extent,
suggesting that their relentless pursuit of answers had indeed been the primary
goal of Plato shared with Socrates as opposed to the simplistic notion of Platonic
forms featured by most so-called Platonists. This is hard to believe, and it seems
more likely, in fact, that Plato featured as esoteric doctrine a system of categories
that took on remarkable exoteric appeal, especially among Christian theologians.
Toland also mentioned the blunt advice of Strabo, a contemporary of
Christ, in the first book of his Geography:
. . . for tis impossible to govern the bulk of women, and of the
promiscuous vulgar, by Philosophical discourses, or to lead them into
religion, piety, or fidelity; but to this purpose SUPERSTITION is found to
be necessary, which can never subsist without fictions and miracles. [pp.
81-82]
Even more cynical in Toland’s opinion was the political wisdom of Marcus
Varro, a contemporary of Cicero: “. . . that many things were true, which it was
not onely useful the People shou’d not know; but that, tho absolutely false, it was
expedient the People shou’d believe otherwise.” In other words, the public
should be furnished with more or less credible alternative “truths” to help
suppress the real truth. Toland explained as an aside relevant to early eighteenth
century politics, “This is at present the favorite maxim, not of two or three
persons only in a country, who juggle with the public, and imagine that
deceiving the people is the highest Reason of State.” [p. 93] Obviously this
particular “truth” seems relevant now and again even today.
In any case, Toland explained the essential difference between priests and
philosophers in pursuit of public acceptance: Priests “industriously conceal their
Mysteries,” whereas philosophers “conceal their sentiments of the Nature of
things, under the veil of divine allegories lest being accus’d of impiety by the
Priests . . . they might be exposed . . . to the hatred, if not to the fury of the
Vulgar.” As a result, Toland concluded, the “threefold passion of a true [i.e.
honest] philosopher “ entails “despising the MOB [i.e. the populace], detesting
the Priest, and delighting in his own LIBERTY.” [p. 94] By “liberty” Toland
would seem to have meant the respectability secured by philosophers able to
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minimize challenging the validity of received assumptions. It certainly did not
apply to those like himself who were driven into poverty and public disgrace
through an uncompromising pursuit of the truth.
Obviously, Toland was discussing the circumstances in play relevant to
his own destiny at the time he wrote Clidophorus—not later than 1720—when
there was arguably more intellectual freedom since the Renaissance, but with
ample room for greater latitude yet. Toland opened his final chapter, XIII, with
the remark—
I have more than once hinted, that the External and Internal Doctrine, are as
much now in use as ever; tho the distinction is not so openly and
professedly approv’d, as among the Antients. [p. 94]
By “external doctrine,” he obviously referred to less controversial assumptions
that philosophers could share with the populace without risk, and by “internal
doctrine” he referred to concepts that were best implied without further analysis.
He thereupon told the story of Lord Shaftesbury, once his patron, who declared
in the presence of a lady that “all wise men are of the same religion.” When she
demanded to know exactly what that religion was, he replied, “Madam, wise
men never tell.” [p. 95] In Toland’s opinion, this exchange perfectly illustrated
the risk involved in admitting to others one’s potentially heretical beliefs. On the
other hand, he cited examples of heretics, deists, and atheists having been lured
into admiting their disbelief, only to find themselves drawn into a snare of public
opprobrium. The only effective alternative to such a persistent pitfall, he argued,
was genuine freedom of speech:
Let all men freely speak what they think . . . and leaving their speculative
opinions to be confuted or approv’d by whoever pleases; then you are
sure to hear the whole truth, and till then but very scantily, or obscurely, if
at all. [pp. 95-6]
Until this much freedom of speech is granted, Toland maintained, it is difficult to
know what one believes discounting the risk involved in admitting this belief.
Toland finally expressed his acceptance of what might be described as an
esoteric defense of exoteric practices as proposed by the Christian monk and
ascetic Evagrius, who lived toward the end of the fourth century A.D.: “. . . that it
may sometimes be expedient to ly, in order to do good, exact philosophical truth
not being necessary for the vulgar, who may receive hurt from their knowledge.”
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For this reason, Evagrius concluded, “I shall freely philosophize at home, and tell
fables abroad; neither teaching nor unteaching, but suffering people to live in
their prejudices.” [p. 99] Toland seems to have expressed his full agreement with
Evagrius, in a published essay, albeit in Latin. Toland concluded his remarkable
text by quoting Senesius of roughly the same period in history: “ . . .how hard it
is to come at TRUTH yourself, and how dangerous a thing to publish it to
others.” [p. 100]
Toland’s final philosophical text, Pantheisticon: or, the form of celebrating the
Socratic-Society, seems to have been a somewhat hasty compilation of
esoteric/exoteric distinctions relevant to modern philosophy as well a summary
new scientific data relevant to the fourth and fifth Letters to Serena. In his first
chapter of Pantheisticon, “Preface to the Learned and Ingenious,” Toland once
again warned of the chronic ignorance of religious believers, “The Generality of
Mankind is averse from Knowledge, and vents Invectives against its Partizans,”
and he accordingly went on to concur with Seneca “. . . every Man chuses rather
to believe than judge, Life then is never brought to a Scrutiny . . . Error handed
down from Father to Son embarrasses our Thoughts in its Mazes.” In response to
this collective affliction, Toland asked the simple question, “What therefore
remains to be done?” In effect he recommended the avoidance of hostile
confrontation with the ignorant masses as much as possible. “We shall be in
safety, if we separate ourselves from the Multitude,” he asserted, “For nothing is
so vulgar . . . as to have no Relish for Knowledge.” Quoting Cicero, he asserted,
“Philosophy contents itself with a few Judges; it designedly shuns the Multitude
. . .” Toland went on to paraphrase Cicero’s categorical distinction between truth
and ideas steeped in religious belief, concluding “. . . for there’s a wide
Difference between unfolding Nature’s Mysteries, and discoursing on Religion.”
[pp. 5-8] Since the benighted multitude cannot be entirely excluded from one’s
proximity, Toland concluded, they should effectively be kept at arm’s length and
allowed to adhere to their simplistic answers with relative peace of mind. As
consolation, the inevitably small minority of the population with more serious
conceptual demands can sequester themselves now and again in relative privacy
to share their speculative perspective rooted in a more adequate knowledge of
science and philosophy.
Toland then spent an entire chapter describing various ancient and
modern social organizations favorable to this arrangement somewhat
comparable to that of modern Freemasonry. These included brotherhoods,
fellowships, banquets, Cicero’s “Collecta,” Plutarch’s symposia, and Socratic
societies, all of which supposedly shared the unorthodox materialist assumption
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of a benign and holistic material universe. Without mentioning the role of God,
all members of comparable societies in modern times would be able to concern
themselves with the paradox of an infinite universe as a “perpetual Change of
Forms, and a certain and most beautiful Variety and Vicissitude of Things” in
“everlasting circulation.” God’s role in stabilizing this tumultuous inevitability
would be limited to a pantheistic vision of the universe itself in its entirety:
The Force and Energy of the Whole, the Creator and Ruler of All, and
always tending to the best End, is GOD, whom you may call the Mind, if
you please, and the Soul of the universe [p. 17]
Just as Toland insisted that secularists identify God with the universe itself, he
wanted the brain to be identified as the “principal Seat of the Soul.” Thought and
sensation were to be understood as the product of “Motion of the Brain,” an
“ethereal fire” that would much later be identified as an electrical field of neural
circuitry:
It is this Fire alone, more fleet than Thought itself, and by far more subtil
than any other Kind of Matter, which can with so quick a Motion run over
the tended Cords and Ligaments of the Nerves, and variously agitate
them, according to the different Impressions of Objects upon the Nerves.
[p. 23]
Toland was willing to retain what was later identified as a Lockean emphasis on
the function of human intelligence, but with the understanding that since the
brain “is corporeal and very complex, it can produce nothing but what is
corporeal.” [p. 24] Toland went on to discuss on a similar basis human anatomy,
geology, paleontology, Copernican astronomy, the possibility of a cosmic cycle
among earth, fire, water and air, and other such issues both ancient and up to
date with a pantheistic emphasis on “divine necessity” rooted in the interaction
between constancy and variation of particles.
In Chapter XVI Toland again returned to the principal topic featured by
Clidophorous, the necessity of a viable balance between simplistic popular
religious assumptions on one hand and the more sophisticated inquiry of secular
philosophers identified as Pantheists based on the issues listed above. Toland
indicated that philosophy had already been “divided by the Pantheists as well as
other ancient Sages into External, or popular conceptualization; and Internal, or
“pure and genuine” conceptualization, in order to avoid as much social discord
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as possible on the assumption that philosophers cannot benefit from declaring
serious disagreement with the essentially illiterate multitude:
They [sophisticated philosophers] never enter into a Dispute upon
scholastic Baubles, supposing that, in indifferent Matters, nothing is more
prudent than the old Saying, We must talk with the People, and think with the
Philosophers. [p. 57]
Pantheists thus continued to be justified in their tacit opposition to revelations,
forged miracles, unreasonable mysteries, etc., and when their host nations
intensified their imposition of repressive orthodoxy, these presumably radical
philosophers were encouraged to seek out more tolerant societies abroad, for
example the Netherlands at the time:
But should the Religion derived from one’s Father, once forced by the
Laws, be wholly, or in some respects, wicked, villainous, obscene,
tyrannical, or depriving Men of their Liberty, in such Case the Brethren
[i.e., fellow Pantheists] may, with all the Legality in the World betake
themselves immediately to one more mild, more pure, and more free. [p.
57]
Toland seems to have concluded that the best choice was not to destroy populist
religion but to link it more effectively with science and thereby dilute its thrust if
not altogether eliminating the impact of superstition: “Wherefore, as the Religion
is to be propagated, that’s joined to the Knowledge of Nature, so all the Roots of
Superstition are to be plucked out, and cast away.” [p. 87] Such had already
been achieved, for example, with the termination of witchcraft trials and public
executions, the last of them having occurred in England in 1612. The problem at
this stage in Toland’s exposition was that one could not be sure whether he was
addressing initiates fully supportive of his “esoteric” secular assumptions, as
would be suggested by his reliance on Latin prose, or declaring an “exoteric”
stance to wary churchgoers possibly sympathetic with his effort. To put it more
simply, was he “talking” or “thinking” when he proposed this concession?
In his final chapter, “Of a Two-fold PHILOSOPHY of the PANTHEISTS
that should be followed,” Toland would seem to have answered this question by
suggesting that the Pantheist religion he was proposing could be both esoteric
and exoteric:
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But perhaps it may be imputed as a Fault to the PANTHEISTS for
embracing two Doctrines, the one Exoteric or popular, adjusted in some
measure to the Prejudices of the People, or to Doctrines publickly
authorized for true; the other internal or philosophical, altogether
conformable to the Nature of Things, and therefore to Truth itself. [p. 96]
Of course he realized that too many believers were fully confident of their own
shared versions of the final “truth,” however misguided their assumptions, and
that their commitment had been the source of extraordinary social disruption
over the centuries:
. . . To the Superstitious, or pretended Worshippers of Supreme Powers, I
mean, to spirit-haunted Enthusiasts, or scrupulously Pious, are owing all
Feuds, Animosities, Mutinies, Mulcts, Rapines, Stigmates, Imprisonments,
Banishments and Deaths. [p. 99]
Toland thus maintained that the worthy effort of pantheists to confront and help
mitigate this tendency probably obliged Christian toleration in the fullest sense
of the word, not that Toland mentioned it by name:
If those who are going astray are pleased to be put upon the right Road,
they [pantheists] will courteously point it out to them; if they persist in
their Error, they will, not withstanding, friendly and from their Hearts
exercise a Commerce of Life with them. They know, and lay it down for a
Principle, that no Man is to be disdained or scorned upon Account of
indifferent and harmless Opinions, and that whatever Nation or Religion
he is of, his Company, for the Virtues and Excellencies of his Mind, is to be
sought for, and in no wise to be avoided, but for his Vices, and the
Corruption of his Morals. Therefore a Pantheist will never punish or
disgrace any Man for a mere Sentiment. [pp. 100-101]
Nevertheless, Toland insisted, the pantheist cannot totally submit to blatant
erroneous thinking: “. . . neither shall he be altogether Silent, when a proper
Occasion presents itself except “in Defence of his Country and Friends.” [p. 107]
Often this constraint is tested to the limit, he suggested, since most people
heedlessly weigh issues “in the Scales of Opinion, but very few in those of
Truth.” As a result, a “Silence and prudent Reservedness of Mind” becomes a
necessity, and pantheists need to accept the fact that they cannot be “more open .
. . till they are at full Liberty to think as they please, and speak as they think.”
[pp. 107-8] On this tautological basis he was advocating an interplay between
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candor and withdrawal dependent on one’s circumstances with particular
individuals. This was substantially different from the implications of his original
distinction.
To an unusual extent Toland himself exercised the flexibility he seems to
have advocated. He had excelled at four universities and enjoyed the temporary
friendship of the queen of Prussia as well as both Locke (briefly) and Leibniz (at
greater length), the two most eminent philosophers of his time. He had also
temporarily benefitted from the patronage of Lord Molesworth, the Duke of
Newcastle, Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Earl of Shaftesbury and the Lord Oxford.
Whatever brought to an end his earlier relationships with patrons, he seems to
have unfortunately squandered the patronage first of the Earl of Shaftesbury for
publishing one of his manuscripts without telling him and later the Lord Oxford
for having twice hinted in print his doubts about his loyalty to the Hanoverian
succession. When reduced to severe poverty by financial losses incurred by the
South-Sea Bubble in 1720, Toland partially authored the expose, The Secret
History of the South-Sea Scheme, without having improved his financial difficulties,
and when an incompetent doctor aggravated his modest disorder into a terminal
illness, he survived long enough to publish an exposé of quack medicine, Physic
without Physician.
At the early age of fifty-two Toland died in poverty, and even his last
words on his deathbed in 1722 were controversial. His seemingly humble
assertion that he was going to sleep implied his continuing rejection even at the
point of death of the notion of a fully experienced afterlife. This was also
suggested by the epitaph he wrote just before his death, “Ipse vero aeternum est
resurrecturus, at idem futurus Tolandus nunquam.” Loosely translated: “He shall be
eternally resurrected, but no longer as Toland.” As insisted by Bruno and Toland
himself in Letters to Serena, “the death of our bodies is but matter going to be
dressed in some new form. [p. 191] Toland accordingly seems to have expected
his entire body inclusive of his brain to survive death if in a presumably nonconscious manifestation as promised by Bruno’s interpretation of Democritus
and Epicurus’s theory of atomism that “an unchanging number of particles of
identical material . . . perpetually undergo transformation, one into another.”
[Singer’s Bruno, p. 24]
At Toland’s request, another presumably final epitaph addressed an
entirely different issue, his pride in his success as an author always at the brink
of controversy: “If you would know more of him Search his Writings.”
Unfortunately, most of his published writings fell into almost total obscurity
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along with the decline of deism in mid-century. One can only conclude that few
have truly “searched” his writings to the extent he might have wished.
As indicated in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Toland was a latitudinarian,
a freethinker, a deist, a materialist, and a pantheist. He might not have been “a
really original thinker but one who reflected many influences.” [vol. 8, p. 142] In
any case he was far more active in this pursuit of synthesis than anybody else,
and he can be admired for having said exactly what he thought—including his
awareness that one cannot indulge this freedom excessively. His Religion not
Mysterious can also be admired for having sustained deism to its limit preceding
the transition to full atheism. Moreover, in his Letters to Sabrina, perhaps with
assistance from Leibniz (with whom he exchanged letters in his later years), he
suggested at the turn of the eighteenth century a strictly materialist cosmology
that combined Bruno, Spinoza and Newtonian physics at a fascinating level of
interpretation. Moreover, his later publications, Clidophorus and Pantheisticon,
were entirely justified in having cautioned freethinkers to recognize that the
public at large could not readily cope with the fullest implications of secular
cosmology at such a level, necessitating an unclear double standard that persists
even today between the stringent demands of “esoteric” analysis and more
comfortable “exoteric” assumptions supportive of society’s ordinary spiritual
needs. As to be expected, this necessity still seems important today across much
of the world. Pity the honest philosopher.
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